PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED

BY

DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ARBITRATION.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire holds in Horne
v. Hutchins, 51 Atl. 65 I, that Where the owners of mills on
Statutet

opposite sides of a reservoir of water, each

claiming a right to the water in such quantity
as to interfere with the use of the quantity
claimed by the other, orally submitted their claims to arbitration, an award allowing one party to take the amount of
water carried by the penstock which he then maintained, or
by another of the same dimensions, did not operate as a
transfer of one party's right to the other, so as to be within
the prohibition of the Statute of Frauds; but instead of
increasing or diminishing the share of either, was a mere
*definition of the already existing rights of each which could
be properly done upon a parol submission to arbitration.
Cf. Dunklee v. Railroad Co., 24 N. H. 489.
Frauds;
Water Rights

BANKS.

In American Exchange National Bank v. Theummler, 62
N. E. 932, it appeared that the plaintiff, holding a personal
Drafts for
draft payable to her order, and drawn on a bank
Collection

in St. Louis, left it for collection with a bank in

Milwaukee indorsed in blank. The Milwaukee bank sent
the draft to the defendant, its regular Chicago correspondent, which sent it to a bank in St. Louis, collected the
amount from the drawee, and credited it to the account of the
Milwaukee bank, which was overdrawn. The last-named
bank had meanwhile suspended payment, but the defendant
had no knowledge of this fact when it made the credit, and
had at no time notice that the Milwaukee bank merely held
the draft for collection, and was not its owner. Upon these
facts the Supreme Court of Illinois decides. that the defendant was entitled to apply the proceeds of the draft to the
overdrawn account of the Milwaukee bank, and was riot
therefore liable to the plaintiff. Two judges dissent from
this conclusion.
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BVIDENCB.
A written statement was prepared while an injured person was in possession of all his faculties, and while he beDying
lieved that he would recover. It was intended
Declarations

to be signed in the event of a subsequent con-

viction of impending death. Later the declarant grew
worse, and becoming convinced that his end was near, he
signed the paper. After his death the paper was attempted
to be used as a dying declaration against the man alleged to
have killed the deceased. The Supreme Court of Mississippi
holds it inadmissible as a dying declaration: Harper v.
State, 31 Southern, 195. "Such a paper at the time of its
preparation goes for nothing, of course; and when the time
comes for the execution of it, the tendency of human nature
in extremis to be consistent and follow the formula, without
effort, vitiates it. Such an instrument cannot be said to be
the free and voluntary act of the person, originated and
executed under a solemn sense of impending death."
GUARANTY.
A limited partnership executed its note to a bank as collateral security for such customers' notes as the bank should
Etopei of
discount on its indorsement, a guaranty by one
Guarantor of the members of the firm being indorsed on
such collateral note. Among the notes discounted by the
bank for the firm were a number which were fictitious or
forged. Under these facts the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Third Circuit) holds that the guarantor as well as
the firm was bound by the representations of the latter that
the notes were valid, and could not assert their invalidity
to avoid liability on his guaranty: PennsylvaniaTrust Co. of
Pittsburg v. McElroy, 112 Fed. 509.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.

In Williams v. Bouner, 31 Southern, 207, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi holds that where a ward was seriously
Physician's
services
Nec"lty

injured by accident, so that the services of a

physician were required to preserve her life, the
guardian had authority, without order of court,
to contract for the payment of the physician's charges from
the corpus of the ward's estate; the income thereof being insufficient.
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GUARDIAN AND WARD (Continued).

It is also held in the same case that, though the physician
who had rendered the services to the ward at first charged
the account to her guardian personally, and, on his refusal to
pay the account, brought suit against him as guardian, the
fact that the account had originally been charged to the
guardian individually did not preclude recovery.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

The Supreme Court of Illinois holds in Springer v. De
Wolf, 62 N. E. 542, that where an instrument assigning a
lease stated that the assignment was made in
Assignment
of Asse,
consideration of a certain sum and the "assumpAssumption
tion by the assignee of all the obligations and
Clause
liabilities of the assignor," such assumption
created a privity of contract, as well as a privity of estate between the lessor and the assignee, so as to make the latter
liable for rent to the lessor after'the termination of the rela* tion of lessor and lessee by a further assignment. Of course,
without such "assumption" clause the first assignee of the
lessee would have been liable only during his holding of the
lease. Compare Dean v. Walker, 107 Ills. 540. It is improbable that such a decision in favor of the lessor could be
reached in a State where a third person is denied the right to
sue on a contract made for his benefit.
LIEN.

A person who has a lien on a horse for the expense of its
keeping, and who in good faith demands an excessive sum
Excessive
as a condition of delivering possession to the
Dem ad
owner, will not thereby lose his lien, in the absence of an actual tender by the owner of the sum actually
due, or declaration by the lienor that he will not accept it
if produced, or some equivalent act: Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Folsom v. Barrett; 62 N. E. 723.
It is also. held that such lienor can hold the owner of the
horse personally liable for expenses incurred after his demand for possession, where it does not appear that the owner
has manifested any intent to revoke the contract for keeping
the horse, or that he has ever given the lienor to understand
that he did not intend-some time to discharge the lien.
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LIEN (Continued).

An intervenor who asserts in his petition a general lien in
favor of the class of creditors of whom he is one, on securities in the hands of a receiver of the court, may
Rights of
Intervenor
properly be permitted, in the discretion of the
court, to amend his petition by alleging a specific lien in his
own favor on certain of such securities, growing out of facts
which were not known to him at the time he filed his original
petition, and to rely upon both liens, the two not being inconsistent: U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit)
in Anthony v. Campbell, I12 Fed. 212.
LABOR UNIONS.

Against the dissent of three judges the Court of Appeals
of New York holds that where a labor union refuses to
permit its members to work with fellow serRival
Organizations

vants who were members of a rival organiza-

tion, and notifies the employer of that fact, and that a strike
will be ordered unless such servants are discharged, with intent to secure only the employment of approved workmen,
or to secure the exclusive employment of its members on
their own terms, and the employes objected to are discharged,
neither they nor the organization of which they are members
have a right of action against the union, provided that no
force is employed or unlawful act committed: National Protective Association of Steam Fitters and Helpers v. Cumming, 63 N. E. 369. The case is elaborately considered on
both sides and contains an excellent review of the opposing
views upon a subject of growing interest.
SLANDER.

In Buisson v. Huard, 31 Southern, 293, the facts showed
that aspersions of the defendant upon the plaintiff's charPrivileged
acter were neither just nor well founded. In
comm.nica.
view of the fact, however, that the defendant
tians
di4 not originate nor volunteer the matters complained of, but made use of them in answer to inquiries made
of him by interested parties, touching defamatory remarks
made by other persons, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
holds him protected from an action for damages under the
rules governing privileged communications. One judge dissents without assigning any reasons.
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The Court of Appeals of New York holds in Ward v.
Hasbrouck, 62 N. E. 434, that an agreement for the leasing
of premises for four months, with an option for
Lawith
Optionof
an extension not exceeding three years, is not
within the Statute of Frauds, as a contract not
Renewal
to be performed within a year. It is also held that a lease
for one year, to take effect in the future, need not be in writing. Two judges dissent 'vithout assigning any reason
therefor.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

Where the agent of a telegraph company wilfully sent a
false and forged dispatch to an unmarried man, purporting
to be signed by an unmarried lady, with whom
Fore
D**tch
he had a casual acquaintance, requesting him to
meet her at a certain town, and afterwards exhibited the telegram and boasted of having sent it, the Supreme Court of
.Mississippi holds that the act was within the scope of the
agent's business, so that the telegraph company was liable
for damages arising from the mental suffering caused by
injury to her reputation: Magouirk v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 31 Southern, 206. Compare Richberger v. Express
Co., 73 Miss. 161, and Warehouse Co. v. Pool, 78 Miss. 147.
It is also held that in such action evidence of the agent's
habits as to the use of intoxicants and of his demeanor when
under their influence was admissible to show his fitness for
his position.
The Supreme Court. of Georgia holds in Western Union
Tel. Co. v. FlintRiver Lumber Co., 40 S. E. 815, that when
Error In

one requests another to make an offer for the

sale of an article, and the offer is made by telegraph, and the telegram as delivered to the addressee is ma-:
terially different from the telegram delivered for transmission, the sender is bound by the terms of the proposal as contained in the telegram delivered to the addressee, and may
recover from the telegraph company any damages which he
has sustained in fulfilling a contract resulting from an acceptance of such proposal. See an article written on the
general subject by M. J. Stevenson, Esq., in 54 Cent. Law
Journal, :23.
Telegram
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TORT.

A person cannot make the forced discohtinuance of an
illegal act simply through threats the foundation of a legal
right: Supreme Court of Louisiana in Prude v.
Damage.
from
Sebastian, 31 Southern, 764; and applying this
'Mr
ts
general principle it is held that a person cannot
claim damages from another for the loss of prospective
profits of his business, by reason of his having forced him
to discontinue it by threats, where it is shown that the
business which was discontinued was the illegal selling of
intoxicating liquors without a license.
TRUSTS.

It is improper and incompatible with the relation of a ces
tui que trust towards the trust estate that she should afterTrustee
wards be appointed trustee: Court of Appeals
of New York in Woodbridge v. Bockes, 63 N. E. 362.
This principle is applied in this case under peculiar circumstances. A testator gave his residuary estate to the defendant in trust to apply the income thereof to the use of the
testator's daughter during her life, remainder to her children. The trustee turned the management of the property
over to the daughter's husband under a power of attorney
ratified by her, and seventeen years later made over all the
real estate included in the trust to the daughter individually,
and at the same time she and her children, who were then of
age, released the trustee from all liability. Thereupon the
daughter was appointed substituted trustee, and some ten
years after executing the release, sued the defendant in her
capacity as trustee to compel an accounting in her own behalf
as cestui que trust. The court holds that she cannot maintain the action.
TRUSTEES.

In Ahrens v. Jones, 62 N. E. 666, the Court of Appeals
of New York deals with the case where in prospect of death,
Trustee
and in order equitably to dispose of his property
Bx Maleflo

among those entitled to it, the grantor conveyed

it to his wife upon her express promise that she would pay
a specific sum to his grandchild, and holds that, while the
deed created no express trust, equity would treat the woman
as a trustee ex inaleficio, and compel her to turn over such
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sum to the grandchild. The court relies principally on the
well-known case of Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y.
282 (323).

Against the decision one of the arguments

made was that no trust was created for the reason that the
defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain sum of money,
and not to turn over to her any portion of the property described in the deed. But the court holds that it must have
been intended that the payment should be made out of the
property since the grantor had invested his wife with the
whole title, so that she had the power to mortgage, lease or
sell, and since she had no other property, this fact being
-

specifically alleged.

But in Monson v. Hutchin, 62 N. E. 788, where a bill alleged the conveyance of a tract of land by complainant to his
father, with the understanding that the father should retain
the same only for his'support, and reconvey either by deed
or will, but there was no allegation that the agreement to reconvey was in writing, the bill was held demurrable by the
Supreme Court of Illinois, because it was regarded as setting
-up an express trust, resting in parol, and therefore void by
the statute of frauds. The alleged trust, it was held, arose
only from the agreement and not from the existence of. facts,
and consequently was express and not resulting. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile this case in principle with the preceding one.

USURY.

In Gantz v. Lancaster,6z N. E. 413, the Court of Appeals
of New York holds that a contract by a mortgagee with one
EZ.uZSIon

of Motgaze

purchasing the premises subject to the mortgage
debt to extend the time for its payment in con-

Debt
sideration that he assume such debt, and pay a
sum above the legal interest for such extension, was usurious.
The decision of the Appellate Division, which was reversed,
proceeded on the theory that to constitute a valid agreement
for the extension of 'the time ot payment of the mortgages in
suit, it was necessary that some consideration should, be
paid, and that by reason of that necessity, the contract to pay
a sum in excess of the legal interest was justified: Compare
in accord with the final decision, Perkinsv. Hall, io5 N. Y.
539.
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WATER COURSE.

In Mace v. Mace, 67 Pac. 66o, the Supreme Court of Oregon holds that where there is a natural depression in a river
Interference bank, with a well-defined channel leading therefrom through which the water is accustomed to
flow during the irrigating season, thereby rendering the
plaintiff's lands highly productivI, the waters flowing
through such channel partake of the nature of a natural
stream to such extent that the defendant cannot, by damming
up such outlet, divert such water to the plaintiff's injury. The
court further decides that where in an action to restrain the
defendant from obstructing the flow of water through a
natural depression to the plaintiff's land, his rights are those
of a riparian owner only, and not based on contract or usage,
the court cannot decree the maintenance and regulation of
artificial works constructed by the defendant, but only the
restoration and maintenance of the natural condition: See
West v. Taylor, 16 Or. 165; Cox v. Bernard,39 Or. 53-

WAYS.

The principle that a way of necessity arises only upon
an implied grant is well illustrated in the case of Quimby v.
Way of

Straw, 51 Atl. 656. In that case two adjoining

owners of property agreed to erect their buildings using a party wall between the first story and having
no partition on the second story. The Supreme Court of
New Hampshire holds that no way of necessity arises in
such case for the reason that such a way arises only from
an implied grant, and that the agreement to erect the buildings according to the plan on which they were constructed
was not a grant of land or of any interest therein.
Necenity

